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INTRODUCTION
If one uses or discovers Heidegger’s metaphysics when engaging with a film,
is one doing philosophy of film with theory or without theory? If the answer
is that one is doing philosophy with theory, then what are the implications
for bringing the insights and ideas of Stanley Cavell or Ludwig Wittgenstein
to bear in cinematic encounters or investigations?1
In championing what we have christened ‘philosophy of film without the-
ory’, Craig Fox and I are adding our own activities to those of others, past
and present, who philosophise in non-, a-, and anti-theoretical ways. We are
motivated by the view that doing philosophy need not be a matter of pursu-
ing, creating, developing or testing theories.2 That said, would characterising
a film as Heideggerian, applying Cavellian considerations, or bearing in mind
Wittgensteinian insights when doing philosophy of film, be a matter of doing
philosophy with theory, albeit in a less obvious guise?3 Is the development
of Cinematic Humanism – my own current project – guilty of applying a
putatively theoretical ‘ism’ where an ‘ism’ is neither needed, wanted, nor
philosophically appropriate? Do my own Wittgensteinian cinematic reflec-
tions run counter to the very rubric that gives philosophy of film without
theory its raison d’être?
In what follows, I explore these questions by considering Terrence Malick’s
2005 film The New World. I begin with a Heideggerian reading of the film
before considering what, if any, theoretical commitments this requires and
might entail. I then present a limited Cinematic Humanist engagement with
the film and, using the same criteria in the first instance, reflect on the extent
to which this is, or is not, theoretical.
I. MALICK AND HEIDEGGER
The practice of viewing the films of Terrence Malick through the lens of, or in
tandem with, Martin Heidegger’s philosophy is unsurprising given the writer-
director’s early philosophical pursuits.4 As an undergraduate in the 1960s,
Malick studied philosophy under, amongst others, Stanley Cavell. He sub-
sequently met Heidegger in Germany, briefly, before translating the philoso-
pher’s 1929 Vom Wesen Des Grundes; published in 1969 as The Essence of
Reasons. Malick then began his doctorate at Magdalen College, Oxford un-
der Gilbert Ryle’s supervision. According to Hubert Dreyfus, Malick’s thesis
was ‘to be on ‘World’ and Heidegger and Wittgenstein’.5 Before completing
his first year, however, Malick left academic philosophy and enrolled on the
American Film Institute’s inaugural course for aspiring directors, in 1969.
Since then, Malick has directed nine fiction feature films, several documen-
taries and shorts, and produced for other filmmakers.6 Malick’s youthful
involvement with Heidegger’s philosophy, together with his cinematic preoc-
cupations and style, have resulted in many of his films being characterised as
Heideggerian.
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Simon Critchley warns, however, against slipping on the ‘hermeneutic ba-
nana skin’ of reading too much biography into Malick’s films, before he iden-
tifies ‘obvious philosophical parallels’ between Heidegger’s notions of ‘Angst’
and ‘Being-towards-death’ in Captain Witt’s ‘calm’ during the final moments
of his life, in Malick’s 1998 film The Thin Red Line.7 Robert Sinnerbrink
presses the point that ‘the relationship between Heidegger and Malick should
remain a question’ 8 before suggesting Malick’s films be understood as a kind
of ‘cinematic poesis’ capable of bringing the director’s films into a ‘reflec-
tive relationship with Heidegger’s thought’ without ‘reducing the meaning
of the film to a Heideggerian meta-text’.9 Undaunted by any cautionary
caveats, Marc Furstenau and Leslie MacAvoy insist that Malick’s films offer
not merely ‘Heideggerian content’10 but that the writer-director has ‘trans-
formed his knowledge of Heidegger into cinematic terms’.11 James Morrison
declares that all of Malick’s four (at the time of his writing) films ‘have always
been “Heideggerian” ’ and little in Malick’s output since suggests Morrison
would be uncomfortable in extending his assertion.12
One premise of Steven Rybin’s revealingly titledTerrence Malick and the
Thought of Film is that ‘Malick’s films themselves ultimately shape our un-
derstanding of what many of Heidegger’s most important ideas about art
mean’.13 Elsewhere, however Rybin reverses the direction of illumination, en-
couraging the use of Heideggerian thinking and concepts ‘to frame how we can
understand Malick’s cinema’.14 Stanley Cavell acknowledges that the ‘partic-
ular mode of beauty’ of images in Malick’s first film, Badlands, ‘strikes me as
a realisation of some sentences from Heidegger’s What is Called Thinking?’15
And, finally, Kaja Silverman, unhesitatingly characterises The Thin Red Line
as:
more than a philosophically oriented film. It does philosophy, ev-
ery bit as much as a text like Heidegger’s On the Way to Language
might be said to do. Like the Heidegger of this disclosive text,
moreover, Malick is not content merely to speak about Being; he
also shows it to us.16
These writers are just some of those who bring Heidegger to their consid-
eration of Malick’s work and/or find his philosophy there. To explore the
possible theoretical implications of this, I focus of Malick’s fourth film, The
New World.17
Briefly: The New World dramatises various relationships had by Poca-
hantas, daughter of Powhatan, in the wake of the first European colonists’
arrival at what will become Virginia (figure 1). Specifically, it dramatises her
loving relationship with first-wave colonial adventurer Captain Smith; her
banishment from her own community; her heartbreak at Smith’s departure
and believed death; her love-less marriage to second-wave colonist John Rolfe;
her visit to the English royal court with Rolfe and their son; her reunion with
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Smith and consequent climactic realisation that she no longer loves him, but
her husband. It ends with Rolfe recounting Pocahontas’ death in England
and his return home with their child.18
Figure 1: Pocahontas witnesses the Colonists’ arrival: her openness contrasts with
her brother’s cautious reticence. A future choice is prefigured in the framing.
The plot of The New World mixes historical fact, myth and fiction. Dia-
logue phrases are sourced from 20th century poetry, Montaigne’s Essays, first-
hand accounts of 17th century European travellers, and the real-life Smith’s
own writings.19 Use is made of many of the director’s signature techniques:
magic hour and natural-light-only cinematography; a hand-held camera that
seems to float; questioning and reflective voice-overs; cut-aways of flora and
fauna, particularly grasses and trees moving in the wind, flying birds and
running water; a pace that will not be hurried; and limited dialogue often
mixed down to be just another layer in a soundtrack dense with the noises
of wind, water, insects and other animals. Musical leitmotifs cue or echo
emotional and story developments. Repeated use is made of the Overture to
Wagner’s Rheingold and the Adagio from Mozart’s Piano Concerto No. 32.
Stylistically, the result blends epic romance, gritty historical social realism,
and an immersive, painterly, sky-, water-, and landscape pastoral.
I now offer what I take to be a Heideggerian engagement with the film,
in order to ask if this is a case of doing philosophy with, or without theory?
Spoiler alert: this Heideggerian reading has a rhetorical function that will be
made clear in Section III.
II. BEING-IN-THE-(NEW)-WORLD
In The New World, Malick’s thematic exploration of new, old, and possi-
bly transcendent, worlds prompts comparison with Heidegger’s metaphysical
distinction between what he takes to be human beings’ merely ‘ontic’ ways
of being, and Dasein’s more fundamental ontology of ‘Being-in-the-world’.20
Specifically, Pocahontas’ encounters with the sky and nature, together with
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her seemingly religious practices appear to dramatise Heidegger’s notion of
dwelling; where dwelling is taken to be ‘the basic character of Being in keep-
ing with which mortals exist’21 and in virtue of which we ‘attain the world as
world’.22
Might Heidegger’s dwelling-constituted world be one and the same as that
‘New World’ once had, then lost and finally recaptured by Pocahontas in her
own film-length journey? Might her story be understood as a cinematic re-
alisation – or equivalent – of what it is for mortals to dwell, and the plight,
according to Heidegger, that Dasein has no other choice but to ‘ever search
anew for the nature of dwelling’?23 Moreover, given that dwelling, as pro-
posed by Heidegger, is encountered ‘only when poetry comes to pass and
is present’24, might The New World’s exquisite photography, richly layered
soundtrack, and rhythm-sensitive editing, offer a cinematic consummation of
film-as-philosophy and film-as-poetry?
In Being and Time, dwelling is a constitutive aspect of Dasein and has
a crucial role to play in Heidegger’s search for the answer to the ‘question
of Being’. By incorporating his characterisation of what it is to dwell into
his wider metaphysical vision, Heidegger develops his ontological view that
Dasein’s world is not a causal construction out of sensations, encountered
without, or prior to, their having, semantic content. Rather Dasein’s world
is a way of Being that one might describe – in unHeideggerian vernacular –
as meaningful all the way down:
The fact that motor-cycles and wagons are what we proximally
hear is the phenomenal evidence that in every case Dasein, as
Being-in-the-world, already dwells alongside what is ready-to-hand
within-the-world; it certainly does not dwell proximally alongside
‘sensations’; nor would it first have to give shape to the swirl
of sensations to provide the springboard from which the subject
leaps off and finally arrives at a ‘world’.25
In other words, the location of Dasein’s dwelling is not some spatio-temporal
position, but rather a socio-cultural context, or meaning-soaked environment.
In the wake of Heidegger’s self-christened philosophical ‘turn’, dwelling
becomes less of a given and more of an elusive feature of Dasein’s ontological
Being-in-the-World. Dwelling is now to be striven for; mortals risk losing,
might squander, or even fail to achieve it. Under this re-conception, human
beings suffer ‘the real plight of dwelling’ in virtue of having to ‘ever search
anew’ for it.26 This task requires overcoming our ‘homelessness’; a home-
lessness made more acute by the precariousness and disenchantment of our
modern, technological age.
The (sometimes learned) achievement of dwelling reveals its essentially
‘simple nature’ in what Heidegger calls a ‘presencing’. This both is, and is to
be understood as, the preserving of a quartet of interrelated elements, namely,
‘the simple oneness of the four we call the fourfold’ of earth, sky, divinities and
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mortals.27 According to Heidegger, the preservation of the fourfold requires
us ‘to save the earth, to receive the sky, to await the divinities, [and] to escort
mortals’.28 Saving the earth is not a matter of mastering or subjugating it but
rather setting it ‘free into its own presencing’.29 Similarly, receiving the sky is
a matter of letting the sky, sun, moon and seasons follow their own courses,
unfettered. Awaiting divinities is the task, and challenge, of avoiding making
one’s own gods and worshipping idols, whilst waiting ‘in the very depth of
misfortune’ for that ‘weal that has been withdrawn’.30 And finally, escorting
mortals is a matter of initiating our own nature; a nature capable of ‘death
as death’, such that ‘there may be a good death’.31
This fourfold integration is available to a mortal who ‘is’ importantly al-
ready a ‘Being-in-the-World’. For ‘here’ an opportunity or an arena appears
(or comes into Being) wherein a geographical place might encounter or co-
alesce with an otherwise non-spatio-temporal, unlocatable ‘place’. And it is
here that man strives to be (and thereby ‘Be’ at last) able to dwell; here
where, for Heidegger, the ‘poetic in dwelling’32 is found:
Poetry and dwelling not only do not exclude each other; on the
contrary poetry and dwelling belong together, each calling for the
other. ‘Poetically man dwells.’33
Furthermore, in this metaphysical but nonetheless still ‘measurable’ space,
man can, in virtue of his kindness, ‘succeed in measuring himself not un-
happily against the godhead’;34 something which is, presumably, a way of
awaiting the divinities’ arrival whilst living in the sustaining of the fourfold.
When the poetic appropriately comes to light, then man dwells
humanly on this earth, and then – as Hölderlin says in his last
poem – ‘the life of man’ is a ‘dwelling life’.35
Everything from the premise of The New World to its props looks ripe for
philosophical dialogue with Heidegger’s notion of dwelling. The Europeans
search for a promised land, their quest to discover a new ‘kingdom of the
spirit’36 readily captures the intermingling of the physical and metaphysical
that is essential to Heidegger’s notion of dwelling, and the attainment of a
new world. The struggle faced by the aboriginal inhabitants to hold on to
their world (not just their land) in the face of colonial onslaught, reveals
the vulnerability of dwelling is apiece with what Heidegger identifies as the
plight of homelessness. In the aboriginal community’s practices the essence
of dwelling, as ‘preserving the fourfold’ is found in ‘saving the earth, receiving
the sky, awaiting divinities, and initiating their own nature as being capable of
death as death’. To explore this further, I focus on the three main characters;
first Pocahontas.
The New World is strategically punctuated with Pocahontas’ salutations
to ‘Mother’ – an enacted gesture of holding out her hands to the sky whilst
looking upwards (see figures 2, 3 and 4).
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Figure 2: Pocahontas’s salutation is sky- rather than sun-directed.
Figure 3: Pocahontas’s sky-directed salutation is framed to facilitate a union of sun,
sky and earth.
Figure 4: Pocahontas’s skyward salutation is done near water perhaps echoing her
return to that world of unqualified joy dramatised in the film’s opening (pre-European
arrival) swimming sequence.
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This apparently religious practice is also on show in the men’s sunset saluta-
tion whilst fishing (see figure 5).
[In] this realm [of sheer toil], man is allowed to look up, out of
it, through it, toward the divinities. The upward glance passes
aloft towards the sky, and yet it remains below on the earth. The
upward glance spans the between of sky and earth. This between
is measured out of the dwelling of man.37
Figure 5: Indigenous tribesmen practice a water-involving, sky-directed salutation.
These skyward gestures dramatise three of the four elements constitutive of
dwelling: saving the earth, receiving the sky and awaiting divinities. The
fourth element – a ‘good death’ – is woven into the ending montage with
Pocahontas’ most celebratory sky salutations. The value of these elements is
presented during the ‘language-learning’ sequences when ‘sky’, ‘sun’, ‘water’
and what seems to be ‘wind’, or perhaps ‘spirits’ or indeed ‘Mother’ are the
first words Pocahontas teaches Smith (see figure 6, 208).
Smith’s initial encounter with this newfound land, stirs a questioning gaze
and questing search amongst the rivers, forests and sky, and we see his at-
tempts to measure that space between land and sky in search of a dwelling
place that calls but cannot be comprehended. ‘Who are you whom I so faintly
hear, who urge me ever on? What voice is this that speaks within me? Guide
me towards the best.’ Smith’s voice-over manifests his yearning for, and ten-
tative recognition of, a something, he knows not what.
As the conflict between the Colonists and the Naturals deepens, and the
relationship between Smith and Pocahontas comes under pressure from the
realpolitik of colonial ambition, Smith stumbles in his nascent fumbling to-
wards a way of dwelling. Pocahontas no longer takes for granted the security
of the practices that have shaped her spiritual life to date. Doubt enters
her soul. ‘Mother. Where do you live? In the sky? The clouds? The sea?
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Figure 6: Pocahontas’s language lesson involves the intermingling of the actions of
her salutation practice and its seeming vocabulary.
Show me your face. Give me a sign.’ The precariousness of dwelling is made
visible through acting and action, and audible in voice-over. When Pocahon-
tas confesses to herself that Smith seems to her ‘a god’, the threat to the
dwelling-imbued activity of awaiting the divinities grows.
Meeting Smith several years later in England, Pocahontas regains the
dwelling place when realising her erstwhile idol-worship has evaporated and
that it is Rolfe she loves. As Rolfe’s recognises, ‘She weaves all things to-
gether’. Moreover, when Rolfe acknowledges, ‘I touched her long ago – with-
out knowing her name,’ we are invited to contrast his own successful search
for a dwelling place with Smith’s frustrated quest. The ambiguities of the
‘her’ in Rolfe’s ‘I touched her long ago’, invoke purposeful ambiguities be-
tween her/Pocahontas and her/the spirit ‘Mother’, and her/‘the promised
land’. Thus, the ‘weal’ that once drove Pocahontas from her own place of
dwelling is healed as unqualified loving and dwelling coalesce in the Heideg-
gerian horizon of The New World.
Smith’s own climactic admission to Pocahontas, ‘I thought it was a dream
what we knew in the forest. It’s the only truth’, is a late-arriving appreciation
that a world once tentatively inhabited is now lost. The possibility that Smith
might dwell has unravelled, gone with a poetic way of Being that eludes
but still haunts him. Smith and Pocahontas are left on opposite sides of a
primordial metaphysical gulf that he cannot bridge and she neither wants nor
needs to.
Even at the micro level Heideggerian interplay and disclosure is at work
in The New World. A key prop in the film is a jug given as a present to
Pocahontas and Rolfe. In The Thing,38 Heidegger uses a jug to articulate
his distinction between a thing, as opposed to a mere object. Out of the
jug’s ‘taking and keeping’, that is its ability to receive, hold and pour, can be
wrought an understanding of the essence of pouring as a consecrated libation.
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It is ‘the gift of the outpouring’ that ‘makes a jug a jug’ and ‘[i]n the jugness
of the jug, sky and earth dwell’.39 Heidegger’s extended exploration of the jug
as ‘thing’, opens up a further metaphysical proposal that ‘each thing stays [ie.
it ‘gathers and unites’] the fourfold – into a happening of the simple onehood
of the world’.40 In so doing it ‘things’ and thereby brings about ‘the nearing
of the world’ which simultaneously ‘occurs out of the ringing of the world’s
mirror-play’ (see figure 7).41
Figure 7: The jug ‘things’ in the hands, and play, of Pocahontas, Rolfe and their
son.
The lyrical shooting of Pocahontas’s ‘jug-play’ scene might well be taken as
a resounding dramatisation of this ‘ringing of the world’s mirror-play’. And
so on . . .
This barely scratches the surface of the fecundity of Heidegger’s philosophy
as a way of thinking about The New World or perhaps better, as a film-
philosopher might put it, the way The New World itself thinks.
III. ANALOGISING AS THEORY
Exploring Heidegger’s philosophy, and proposing and developing analogies
between it and films is undoubtedly rewarding, but is it philosophy? Is it
philosophy of film? Is it philosophy of film with or without theory?
There are, I believe, four ways of characterising the previous section: (i)
data-gathering to support a metaphysical theory; (ii)philosophically inflected
film criticism; (iii) the illustration of philosophical texts; (iv) an exercise
in collapsing categorial distinctions between film-viewing, film-making and
philosophising.
With Option (i) The New World is a reservoir of empirical evidence po-
tentially capable of corroborating Heidegger’s metaphysical edifice. For those
who regard philosophy as a conceptual rather than empirical matter, however,
(i) is not philosophy; so any with/without theory distinction is irrelevant. To
those for whom philosophy is sensitive to empirical confirmation, there is no
209
The New World: Heideggerian or Humanist Cinema?
prima facie reason to deny that (i) is philosophy and indeed philosophy of
film. Furthermore, the very task of using evidence to confirm, or otherwise,
substantial metaphysical claims itself is a theoretical practice and thereby
the Heideggerian reading qua Option (i) is most definitely philosophy with
theory.
One might object that empirical evidence taken from films must deal with
potentially problematic issues relating to the metaphysics of fiction but the-
oretical views on the use of thought experiments might provide acceptable
responses to such concerns. More problematic for Option (i) is the nature of
the putative evidence-theory relation, for the relation articulated is less one
that offers warrant and more a case of proposing analogies. Perhaps Options
(ii) and (iii) are more appropriate ways of characterising the substance of
Section II. When analogies are drawn from Heidegger’s system and applied
to the film, as with (ii), they enrich the content of the film; when the di-
rection of travel is reversed, as with (iii), the analogies serve as cinematic
illustrations of Heidegger’s theoretical metaphysics. Option (ii) looks to fit
the tradition and practices of film Theory in which evidence for Lacanian,
semiotic, Marxist, feminist, etc., theories are found in films. Whether those
theories, or Heideggerian metaphysical theories of Being, the film is taken as
providing cinematic warrant capable of confirming the truth of the considered
theory. Parallels with film Theory, and its heir, film-philosophy, offer another
theoretical way of doing philosophy.
In contrast, with Option (iv), the analogising not only helps dissolve dis-
tinctions between making films, viewing films, and philosophising, it blurs to
the point of potential redundancy the differences between films as works of art
and written philosophy as works of philosophy. This serves post-structuralist
ambitions to collapse the difference between a work and a text, to regard
everything as a text, and to see all texts if not actually on a par, then on
a continuum. Whatever the value or otherwise of this activity, it is uncon-
tentiously theory-involving. As such, if it is also construed as philosophy,
it too is philosophy with theory. It is noteworthy that once the distinction
between different categories of works is lost (works of art, of history, of philos-
ophy, etc.) then the resulting texts are now suitably a-categorially positioned
for claims that films can be and do philosophy.
To summarise: either my Heideggerian reading of The New World is phi-
losophy with theory, or it is not philosophy at all. In so far as it is regarded
as the former it encourages the commitment to various views, including: (a)
the presumption that philosophical ‘hypotheses’ are subject to empirical con-
firmation; (b) fiction films are an instrumentalisable source of evidence for
extra-cinematic theories; and (c) the activity of drawing analogies between
texts is a form of philosophising.
A major consequence of these commitments is that it becomes difficult
to distinguish between drawing an insightful analogy between an aspect of a
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film and an idea in the history of philosophy and using an aspect of a film to
legitimise that idea. In making these analogies one looks to be implicitly rat-
ifying Heidegger’s metaphysics. Yet one might wish to accept the pertinence
of the analogy whilst challenging the substance of Heidegger’s views.
If one questions, for example, the very idea that there is an ontic/ontological
distinction between being and Being and that ‘not-yet primordial’ meta-
physics is doomed never to reach ‘the truth of Being’, what is the purpose of
identifying these putatively supporting analogies in films?42
Providing a Heideggerian reading of The New World in a film-philosophical
spirit reveals the diversity of ways in which theory and Theory are implicated
and may compromise the philosophical rewards it strives for. Might there
also be comparable difficulties for Cinematic Humanism, which I take to be
an example of philosophy of film without theory?
IV. THE NEW WORLD – A CINEMATIC HUMANIST
ENCOUNTER
Near the end of the The New World Pocahontas realises that the man she loves
is her husband John Rolfe, and not, as she had presumed, Captain Smith.
Prompted by this revelation, she reaches up to the sky saying, ‘Mother! Now
I know where you live’. Pocahontas’ gesture dramatises her (and our) real-
isation that the sought-for new Kingdom of the Spirit is not a land to be
found through geographical discovery, physical exploration or colonial con-
quest, rather it is constituted in our loving relationships. Furthermore, the
home of these loving relationships is perhaps the ‘New World’ of the title:
a world Pocahontas herself initially, but unreflectively, inhabits (with her
beloved brother and father) and from which she is subsequently banished
(when her father disowns her; her brother is killed; and Smith departs and
reportedly dies) and which she finally regains in realising her love for her
husband and confirming her love for her son (see figures 8 and 9, on 212).
Pocahontas’ journey simultaneously dramatises the journeys of her view-
ers; journeys in which we live our human form of life, in one or more of its
many human forms (plural) of life and come to realise things about our human
condition throughout our life. This point is not made by, or learnt by, our
extracting hypotheses from the film and testing them against the tribunal of
experience in an extra-cinematic world. Rather it is learnt by engaging with
the film itself. For in the actions, reaction, activities and practices of Poca-
hontas, Rolfe, Smith, the Naturals and the Colonists we come to see ourselves
as people who make choices, do things, react to things that happen to us, and
know pain, yet who also search for, find and try to hold on to meaning, value,
comfort, and joy.
For this reason, I believeThe New World is a work of cinematic art that is
of epistemic value. In other words, it confirms the central tenet of Cinematic
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Figure 8: Pocahontas radiates her newly realised love for Rolfe in an over-the-
shoulder reaction shot.
Figure 9: Pocahontas’s love for her son is seen in an over-the-shoulder reaction shot
echoing her encounter in Figure 8.
Humanism, namely, that we can achieve valuable epistemic understanding
of ourselves, each other, and our human form, and forms, of life by actively
engaging with some fictional works of cinematic art. In the next section, I
consider whether or not this is a theoretical commitment or entailment which
puts Cinematic Humanism on all fours with claims that the film is an example
of Heideggerian cinema. But before that, a little more on the film.
Pocahontas’ final celebratory montage dramatises her newfound world of
loving delight. It simultaneously provides the culmination of her story and
the film’s overarching story and defies that either be regarded as a tragedy.
For some critics this spurning is at the very least naïve and, at worst, shameful
given the genocidal consequences of the colonial enterprise. In dramatising
the idea that out of the miscegenation of victor and vanquished and the re-
blooming of unconditional love, there is a way to move beyond the colonial
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holocaust, The New World shows, I would argue its political audacity.43
There is also a not-unrelated structural audacity at work in the film.
For on the one hand, Pocahontas’ story can be seen as readily conforming
to a classic three-act structure with its clear beginning, middle and climax-
involving end. On the other hand, the handling of the point-of-view cam-
ouflages whose story the film is for nearly two-thirds of its length. The film
spends the first 90 (of its 130) minutes as a twin point-of-view story, cutting
between the lives and worlds of Pocahontas and Smith. This exploits the
familiar conventions of a dual-protagonist love story by not giving either a
favoured point-of-view in their private shared scenes. Once, however, Smith
leaves Jamestown, 40 minutes from the end of the film, the film becomes
almost entirely Pocahontas’ point-of-view. There is a single shot of Smith
on distant windswept shores (before their reunion), and we briefly experi-
ence Rolfe’s point-of-view when we first meet him, primarily, I believe, as a
way to avoid his final voice-over exposition about Pocahontas’ death being
unprecedented,and thereby jarring.
These manipulations in the point-of-view (henceforth ‘pov’) exploit, only
to overturn, viewer expectations about the person whose story it is. Main-
stream films rarely separate the pov of view of the story and the person whose
story it is (i.e., the person who has the most substantial character develop-
ment, or journey). The standard approach is to conflate the two. In setting
up a dual pov film, the film’s grammar prioritises the Pocahontas-Smith re-
lationship, announcing them as co-equal leads. Once this changes in the last
forty minutes the viewer is prompted to recapitulate the story to date, and
newly appreciate Pocahontas’s actual status as the sole protagonist. This au-
dacious and temporarily destabilising story structure is not, however, sprung
on us out of nowhere.
In the ceremony at the Naturals’ longhouse, when Smith is first captured,
he recounts in voice-over, ‘At the moment I was to die she threw herself upon
me.’ Just prior to this moment, however, we see Pocahontas on stand-by,
being cued to join the proceedings with a nod from father, Powhatan.44 It
subsequently becomes clear that she has been instructed to engage in this life-
saving intercession, and that she is playing a preordained role in the ceremony.
Whether the ceremonial requirements demand that the person who intercedes
be of high standing (e.g., the Chief’s daughter) or whether Powhatan delib-
erately chooses Pocahontas because she is best positioned to befriend Smith,
and thus discover the Colonists’ plans, is unclear, but both reasons may ap-
ply. Either way, Powhatan is confirmed as strategically savvy and tactical
shrewd, whilst Pocahontas is revealed to an unquestioning follower of parental
authority. Smith’s voice-over announcement about her ‘life-saving interces-
sion’ quickly reveals him to be an unreliable narrator; this then enables the
subsequent shift to Pocahontas’s sole (reliable) pov.45 Further evidence that
Smith’s voice-over is unreliable is demonstrated by the fact people and equip-
ment are ready and waiting for the ‘rebirthing’ section of the ceremony that
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follows the intercession; these would not be needed were Pocahontas’ involve-
ment not stage-managed.
One result of the pov shift to Pocahontas, on Smith’s departure, is to
downgrade the Pocahontas/Smith relationship from being the film’s raison
d’être, to just one of several loving relationships explored. So the film blos-
soms into an exploration of the various kinds of love a young woman might
experience: from the heady passion of a virginal girl for a more experienced
sexual partner to a measured marital love steeped in kindness, respect and
shared labour; from the love between a father and a daughter, which might
be sacrificed for political goals to that of the all-too-temporary playful love
between siblings; and The New World re-envisions the diversity of possible
loving finally to the unquestioning love between mother and child. By playing
with and against the standard pov conventions of a love story, relationships,
putting Pocahontas at the centre of their life-shaping values.
One might view Pocahontas’s journey as a Christian allegory illustrating
Eve’s innocence in the Garden of Eden, her exile from Paradise at the Fall, and
Paradise Regained with her final divine state of grace achieved through the
transformative power of love. But whilst that resonance is, for some viewers
inescapable, Pocahontas’ inculcation into the life and practices of Jamestown
contains no direct education into Christian beliefs or practices, albeit she is
baptised and married (by a ship’s captain). The house Pocahontas moves
into, inside the stockade, once belonged to Jamestown’s now-dead Reverend,
suggesting perhaps that the Christianity inside the fort has been usurped.
There seems to be little, if any, direction that we draw specifically Christian
conclusions about the film’s meaning. Indeed, one might recognise an overtly
anti-Christian aspect given Pocahontas’ journey dramatises the possibility of
reversing the supposed catastrophe of the Fall without divine intervention.
Lloyd Michael’s claim that the film is some kind of ‘synthesis’ of both pa-
gan and Christian religions into a ‘natural religion’ is therefore unjustified.46
No such synthesising occurs. Instead, it is one of the extraordinary achieve-
ments of the film to leave open the door to see the film as both a metaphor
for the meaning-giving existence of a loving Christian God, and for the fact
of ‘His’ complete redundancy.47
The film dramatises the opacity of another’s religious iconography, offering
a re-estrangement of a number of visual symbols for those viewers familiar
with them. When the aboriginals encounter the Colonists’ large wooden cross
and when Pocahontas’ companion, Opechancanough considers the statue of
Jesus and stained-glass windows in the English royal chapel, both cross and
statue are inert: meaningless to curious people for whom the practice of
Christianity is as nothing (see figures 10 and 11, on 215).
The impenetrability of the religious practices of others is also evident in
the extended longhouse ceremony when Smith is ‘reborn’ perhaps as an hon-
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Figure 10: An indigenous tribesman encounters a crucifix outside Jamestown fort.
Figure 11: Opechancanough visits the royal chapel in England.
orary aboriginal. With its shaman- or priest-like figures dressed in tree- and
bird-evoking costumes, and the highly choreographed ‘re-birthing’ experience
– later echoed by Pocahontas’ own Christian baptism – the film shows the in-
extricable intimacy between religious belief and religious practices (see figures
12 and 13, on 216).
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Figure 12: The captured Smith is taken through a religious or cultural ceremony.
Figure 13: Pocahontas is baptised in Jamestown.
To the film’s political and structural audacity, I would therefore add religious
audacity for daring to show religion as a form of life, not a matter of divine
revelation.
There are many such parallels between Smith’s inculcation into the ‘new
world’ that is the Naturals’ way of life, and Pocahontas’s absorption into the
‘new world’ of the Colonists and the ‘new world’ of the English court. We see
afresh not just the similarities and differences in our human practices but the
very fact that we all have them (see figures 14, 15, 16, and 17, on 217 ff.).
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Figure 14: Smith is groomed by a tribesman.
Figure 15: Pocahontas helps Smith with his ablutions (cf. her baptism in Figure 13.)
Figure 16: Pocahontas at her own ablutions, Jamestown-style.
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Figure 17: Pocahontas is dressed (cf. Smith’s grooming in Figure 14); the framing
emphasising the co-existence of the strange and the quotidian.
The English Royal Court is another version of an aboriginal longhouse.
Pocahontas’s walk towards King James, the Queen and officials echoes Smith’s
running-the-gauntlet walk towards Powhatan and his key advisers (see figures
18 and 19, on 219). The clothes of all both are no less meaning-endowed uni-
forms; part and parcel of practices in which they are worn.
With Malick directing, it is unsurprising to see characters’ engaging with
the surrounding natural world as a way of developing various themes. Smith’s
walk amongst the fields and trees – after his reprieve from hanging – is the
wide-eyed encounter of a man who has just escaped death and for whom
the world and its beauty is born anew. The point is echoed and reversed in
Opechancanough’s confused encounter with the trees and hedges of English
Royal Gardens which have been topiarised into submission. It is also echoed,
without irony, by Pocahontas’ delight in the gardens at the end of the film,
when the world and its beauty is born anew for her, too. And so on . . .
In such ways does The New World exploit, toy with, and defy genre expec-
tations and the conventions of film grammar. With the opening sequence of
languorous swimming and the enveloping presence of nature, the film’s style,
pace and rhythm insist that the audience take their time with the film and
abandon expectations prompted by the familiar subject matter. In its final
moments, the film culminates in a montage that mixes our human world with
the realm of nature as Pocahontas’ celebratory salutation, is intercut with her
watching her husband play with their son, playing with the boy herself, shots
of her empty marriage bed, her headstone, rushing rivers and the sunlight
through trees. Throughout, the rumbling Rheingold crescendos, then cuts
out. We are left with just the sound of birds and flowing water as we gaze up
into the tree canopy, watching the trunks and branches sway in the wind. A
leaf falls and the film cuts to black. Pocahontas may be dead, but life goes
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Figure 18: The English court officials scrutinise their unprecedented visitor Poca-
hontas.
Figure 19: The tribesmen scrutinise their unprecedented visitor, Smith.
on, and with it the final dramatic questions of the film are released: how
might or ought I/we to live? what can be chosen and what not? and what
have I/we yet to realise and appreciate? In proselytising for the importance
of treasuring loving relationships – with lover, spouse, parent, child, sibling
and nature – The New World simultaneously shows us that we are people
who also make choices, create meaning, and value love.
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V. CINEMATIC HUMANISM
In Section III., I presented four ways to characterise the Heideggerian en-
counter with The New World. i.e., as one or more of: (i) data-gathering to
support a metaphysical theory; (ii) philosophically inflected film criticism;
(iii) the illustration of philosophical texts; and (iv) an exercise in collapsing
categorial distinctions between film-viewing, filmmaking, and philosophising.
Insofar as these were correctly applicable to the Heideggerian approach they
were shown to be theoretical. Are any of these options relevant to the above
Cinematic Humanist engagement with the film?
Option (i) is beside the point: there is no theory, metaphysical or oth-
erwise, being brought to bear on the film, so the film is not being used to
provide evidence of any such thing. Similarly, Option (iv) has no purchase on
the Cinematic Humanism encounter for I am not claiming that the film itself
is philosophising, nor am I seeking to collapse film-making and film-viewing.
Malick (together with his colleagues in front of and behind the camera) is
responsible for the film. I, as a viewer, am responsible for exploring and dis-
covering what is on screen, its sub-text, and how the cinematic, dramatic,
and other aesthetic resources are brought to bear on the film’s subject in
developing its themes. In so doing I find the film to have artistic, aesthetic
and epistemic value.
This Cinematic Humanist consideration might well be regarded as Option
(ii), i.e., philosophically inflected film criticism. If philosophy is by definition
theoretical then the very idea of philosophy without theory is an oxymoron.
With Craig Fox, I have already argued that philosophy of film without the-
ory is a way of appreciating a range of philosophical methods which include:
fine-grained description and discernment; disentangling confusions; reactive
and/or reflective critical inquiry; the exploration of conceptual connections;
conceptual clarification and synthesis; logical geography; the provision of per-
spicuous presentations and surveyable overviews; non-systematic engagement
with individual or particular works, subjects, objects, ideas, events and/or sit-
uations; and an appreciation that the view is always from somewhere and at
some time, etc.48 I trust that the previous section’s Cinematic Humanist
encounter can be characterised as engaged in a number of these activities,
without having to labour the point. It also accords with Stanley Cavell’s
suggestion that ‘the way to overcome theory correctly, philosophically, is to
let the object or the work of your interest teach you how to consider it’.49
The question remains, though, is Cinematic Humanism, as a particular
example of philosophy of film without theory, philosophically valuable? I
would argue it is because it requires seeing a film, such as The New World,
not just as a work of art, but as a whole constituted not simply by its parts
but by its parts in all their relations with each other and in relation to the
whole; and that this requires an openness to the work and a readiness to
engage with it not just in its historical and cultural context but on its own
terms. This openness requires one to recognise that we bring assumptions
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to bear on the work and in understanding and appreciating the work afresh
we also come to understand and appreciate our assumptions afresh, and in
doing both we see ourselves afresh and anew in the work. To see ourselves
afresh and anew, in the film, is to see ourselves philosophically; and this is
not trivial.
One might nonetheless object that this particular Cinematic Humanist
encounter trades on philosophical theories and as such is philosophy of film
with rather than without theory. Such an objection might leverage Option (iii)
pressing the point that Cinematic Humanism illustrates or exploits Wittgen-
steinian and perhaps Cavellian proposals, albeit in a covert, rather than the
overt Heideggerian way.
There is, however, a major difference between these uses of, or allusions
to, extra-cinematic philosophers, which undermines the potential grip of this
objection. For, in the case of Wittgenstein, he is not a metaphysical sys-
tem builder; he is not a philosophical theoretician; he does not put forward
hypotheses and thus one cannot use cinematic resources as confirmatory evi-
dence for any non-existent theory of his. That said, Wittgenstein is commit-
ted to the use of fiction in conceptual, rather than, empirical investigations.
‘Nothing is more important for teaching us to understand the concepts we
have than constructing fictitious ones’.50 But in exploring the conceptual con-
nections between the different uses of, say, our notion world, in the previous
Section, I am not seeking to prove Wittgenstein right in this claim, for he is
not making an empirical claim. He is just describing a practice, and I am
just engaging in a similar practice.
Along the same lines, my reading does not seek to claim that Pocahontas’
death, as characterised by her husband’s voice-over ‘proves’ Wittgenstein’s
appreciation that death is not an event in one’s own life. Nor am I extract-
ing empirical evidence from the film to justify Wittgenstein’s non-theoretical
observation that the world of a happy man is not the same as that of an
unhappy man.51 In pursuing understanding rather than propositional knowl-
edge, and sense rather than truth, the philosophy of film without theory –
and Cinematic Humanism as one possible example of it – leaves theoretical
pursuits to the scientists and the empiricists.
The objection is perhaps less easily overcome in the case of Cavell, for
although he is not a theorist, his interest in finding commonalities between
films might be taken as proto-theoretical. Were I to take Pocahontas’ final
realisation that she loves her husband Rolfe, and not her first lover Smith, as
evidence for there being non-comedic examples of remarriage films, my pur-
pose would not be to strengthen some supposed Cavellian theory that seeks
to make generalisations about a small clutch of films that share a common
story structure and dramatic idea.
Finally, one might object that the ‘humanism’ in Cinematic Humanism
is a theoretical, or at least quasi-theoretical, notion in its own right. By
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championing Cinematic Humanism as one possible way of doing philosophy
of film without theory, am I not ejecting theory out the front door, only to let
it in through the back? Undoubtedly there are, and have been, theoretical
constructions put on humanism, but I mean to invoke none by my choice
of the term. The ‘humanism’ in Cinematic Humanism is there primarily as
a reminder to myself, and perhaps others, that the approach to philosophy
of film it favours is non-reductive. Unlike cognitive film theory, Cinematic
Humanism does not seek to surrender the personal to the sub-personal. It
is people, not their brains, or any putative intercranial cognitive abilities or
processes who watch films and discover themselves and our human condition
therein. Unlike film Theory and some film-philosophy, Cinematic Humanism
does not regard human beings as impotent ideologically constructed ‘subjec-
tivities’. It is people, rather than any erstwhile human beings, that we find
in films and understand ourselves to be.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In our making, watching and thinking about cinematic works of art we find
artistic, aesthetic and epistemic value. Some ways of doing this can be ap-
preciated as doing philosophy of film without theory and I have proposed and
demonstrated Cinematic Humanism as one such way.
What then of the relation between theoretical philosophy of film and phi-
losophy of film without theory? In the spirit of Morris Weitz’s observation, one
can, I trust, criticise the presumption that philosophical investigations must
aim at definitions and theory construction, whilst simultaneously recognising
that the theoretical practices of others are worth engaging with.52 For al-
though such philosophers may be pursuing a questionable quarry, in so doing
they draw attention to aspects, and features of works of art that sometimes
go unrecognised, overlooked, and/or undervalued. In developing diverse ways
in which to do philosophy of film without theory, there is no reason to self-
isolate to avoid theoretical infection. For this reason, I conclude that The
New World is both a Heideggerian and a Humanist film.53
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NOTES
1Wittgenstein 2009.
2Fox and Harrison 2020 in this issue,
and forthcoming.
3I use ‘film’ and ‘films’ not as medium-
or material-specific terms but as catch-all
nouns for moving picture, or moving im-
age productions of any length or scale that
might reasonably be conceived of as works
of art, either in a classificatory or honorific
sense.
4See Patterson 2007; Rybin 2011 and
2012; Silverman 2003; Barnett 2013;
Donougho 2011; Loht 2013 and 2015; Sin-
nerbrink 2006, 2011, 2014, 2015 and 2019;
Cousins 2007; Critchley 2002,Garrett 2008
and Neer 2011, for some examples of Hei-
deggerian considerations of Malick’s œu-
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vre.
5Maher Jr. 2014, 31-32. This book is
self-published and has obvious inconsisten-
cies. It remains, to my knowledge, the pri-
mary source for identifying Malick’s doc-
toral topic.
6See IMDb for Malick’s filmogra-
phy here: https://www.imdb.com/name/
nm0000517/.
7See Critchley 2002 for his discussion of
Malick’s screen version of the James Jones’
1962 novel of the same name. For Pro-
duction Notes, Cast and Crew, see https:
//www.imdb.com/title/tt0120863/.
8Sinnerbrink 2006, 29.
9Sinnerbrink 2006, 34.
10Furstenau and MacAvoy 2007, 190.
11Furstenau and MacAvoy 2007, 181.
12Morrison 2007, 201-203, original
spelling.
13Rybin 2012, 2.
14Rybin 2011, 14.
15Cavell 1979, xv.
16Silverman 2003, 324.
17See Martin 2007, 220 fn.1, for in-
dividual details of the various versions.
The general release PAL (Region 2) DVD
(New Line Productions) I work with is
130 minutes, not the 135 minutes, re-
ferred to there. The synopsis in fn.17 be-
low is of the shortest of the released ver-
sions. See IMDb for cast, crew and pro-
duction details, here: https://www.imdb.
com/title/tt0402399/.
18A fuller synopsis: 1607 – on the shores
of what will become Virginia, three ships
arrive bringing Europeans and indigenous
people into contact for the first time. As
the construction of the Jamestown fort
gets underway, the Colonists and the so-
called ‘Naturals’ develop a cautious co-
existence. Pocahontas (early/mid-teens)
and Captain Smith (late 20s) – fresh from
the hangman’s noose, pardoned for we
know not what – meet in the fields beyond
the stockade and a mutual fascination be-
gins. When much of the Colonists’ food
is ruined, leader Captain Newport (70s)
returns to England for supplies, send-
ing Smith upstream in search of poten-
tial trading partners. Smith is captured
by Pocahontas’ people, and in an opaque-
to-him ceremony led by her father, Chief
or King Powhatan, Smith believes Poca-
hontas intervenes and saves his life. Poc-
ahontas’s father tasks her with getting
to know Smith, as part of his strategy
to gain information about the new ar-
rivals’ plans. As Smith is inculcated into
the language and practices of this na-
tive community, Pocahontas falls in love
with him and their emotional and (pre-
sumed) sexual intimacy grows. Smith re-
turns to Jamestown discovering an ever-
worsening situation. Just before starva-
tion decimates the remaining survivors,
Pocahontas and other Naturals arrive with
food. Although she is eager to continue
her relationship with Smith, he deliber-
ately distances himself from Pocahontas,
insisting she misunderstands who he is.
Spring brings new hope for the Colonists
as their crops flourish and trading with lo-
cals begins, but when it becomes clear the
Colonists are staying, the Naturals attack
Jamestown. During the fighting, Pocahon-
tas’ brother is killed. Blaming Pocahontas,
Powhatan disowns and banishes his daugh-
ter. The still-estranged Smith finds his
own temporary leadership of the surviv-
ing Colonists usurped. By the time Cap-
tain Newport returns from England with
supplies, and a second wave of Colonists,
Pocahontas is being held hostage in the
fort on the mistaken presumption this will
prevent further attack. Smith is present
but by now, persona non grata. Poc-
ahontas is inculcated into the European
lifestyle and practices. Freshly baptised
‘Rebecca’, she attempts to revive the re-
lationship with Smith. After a few ten-
der, though for him hesitant, encounters,
Smith leaves abruptly, accepting a com-
mission to find a route to the Indies. Poca-
hontas’ heartbreak turns to grief when she
is subsequently told (falsely) that Smith
has died at sea. After a period of sorrow-
ful inactivity, she slowly re-engages with
life’s mundane tasks. Pocahontas unwit-
tingly draws the attention of recent ar-
rival, John Rolfe (30s) accepting his offer
of marriage whilst insisting she does not
love him. Rolfe accepts this fact, announc-
ing his intention to win her love, nonethe-
less. Married, Pocahontas and Rolfe live
outside the stockade walls and cultivate
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tobacco with the help of both Colonists
and Naturals, and Pocahontas gives birth
to a son. A few years later, when she
learns that Smith is still alive, Pocahon-
tas spurns Rolfe’s affections, insisting she
is still ‘married’. Pocahontas and Rolfe ac-
cept an invitation to meet King James I
in England. In the wake of their presenta-
tion at court, Rolfe reveals that Smith is
also present. He encourages Pocahontas to
meet with Smith, confessing he was wrong
to try to make her love him. Pocahontas
re-meets Smith who makes no attempt to
explain his disappearance or win her back;
simply stating that what they ‘had in the
forest’ is ‘the only truth’. Pocahontas re-
turns to Rolfe and declares him to be her
(only) husband, kissing him unreservedly.
In the formal royal gardens Pocahontas of-
fers her familiar, but long absent, religious
salutation to ‘Mother’ declaring, ‘Now I
know where you live’, then plays with her
son. Rolfe’s voice-over reveals that Poca-
hontas died in England, soon afterwards,
but that she accepted her death, believing
it was enough that her child lived. Rolfe
and their son sail back, leaving Pocahontas
buried in England. Rivers flow and trees
branches sway against the sky.
19See Nicol 2011 for a detailed prove-
nance.
20Heidegger 1962.
21Heidegger 1971, 160 original empha-
sis. For more on dwelling see especially
the 1950-51 lecture-based essays Build-
ing Dwelling Thinking, The Thing and
. . . Poetically Man Dwells. . . in Heidegger
1971.
22Heidegger 1971, 182.
23Heidegger 1971, 161.
24Heidegger 1971, 227.
25Heidegger 1962, 207.
26Heidegger 1971, 161.
27Heidegger 1971, 150.
28Heidegger 1971, 158-159.
29Heidegger 1971, 150.
30Heidegger 1971, 150.
31Heidegger 1971, 151.
32Heidegger 1971, 221.
33Heidegger 1971, 227.
34Heidegger 1971, 229.
35Heidegger 1971, 229.
36This is Captain Newport’s phrase in
his address to the Colonists.
37Heidegger 1971, 220.
38Heidegger 1971, 165-182.
39Heidegger 1971, 172.
40Heidegger 1971, 181.
41Heidegger 1971, 182.
42Heidegger 1977, 230 and 203.
43Robert Sinnerbrink tries to cauterise
what he sees as the political naivety of The
New World by characterising it as ‘know-
ing romanticism’ designed to ‘retrieve the
possibility of a reconciliation between cul-
tures and which acknowledges our general
human dependence on nature’ as the ba-
sis for such a reconciliation (Sinnerbrink
2011, 183). Rybin slightly mollifies his
punch but only after landing it, announc-
ing any ‘educated audience’ with the de-
cency enough to be ‘sensitive’ to the his-
torical facts of colonial violence would find
the vision of Pocahontas having a life-
enriching experience in the English Royal
Gardens ‘perhaps offensive’ (Rybin 2012,
166, emphasis added). Indeed, Rybin
backs away from any thematic consider-
ation of the film, as if to avoid guilt by
association. Instead he insists, Pocahon-
tas is ‘keeping that meaning secret’ (Rybin
2012, 164); ‘meaning is held in suspension’
(166). He even suggests that Malick ‘dis-
avows his ability to know’ (164) insofar as
he ‘refuses to explain’ Pocahontas’s spiri-
tual ‘epiphany’ (166). At this point Rybin
retreats to the challenging prose style of
Theory to propose ‘the human being has
no hierarchical place of mastery over the
narrative’ (138).
44Around 24 minutes into the film.
45An examination of the single reaction
shots on her (which there is not space for
here) would show she is not an unreliable
narrator.
46Michaels 2009, 91.
47This point could also be made about
The Thin Red Line.
48Fox and Harrison 2020.
49Cavell 1981, 10.
50Wittgenstein 1982, 19.
51Wittgenstein 1961, 6.43.
52Weitz 1956.
53I dedicate this article to Daniel Shaw
who died in March, 2020. Dan was the
224
Britt Harrison
first person to respond to my Heideggerian
encounter with The New World. I treasure
his personal kindness and generous encour-
agement, not least because of his theoret-
ical commitments. Thanks also to Vernon
Cisney and all the participants of Gettys-
burg College’s 2016 Seminar The Film and
Philosophy of Terrence Malick where the
seeds of this paper and Cinematic Human-
ism were first sown. My thanks also to
Craig Fox, Rob van Gerwen, Peter Lamar-
que and David Levy for comments on ear-
lier versions of this material.
REFERENCES
Barnett, Christopher B. 2013. “Spirit(uality) in the Films of Terrence
Malick.” Journal of Religion and Film 17 (1): Article 33.
Cavell, Stanley. 1979. The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism,
Morality and Tragedy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
. 1981. Pursuits of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Cousins, Marc. 2007. “Praising The NewWorld.” In The Cinema of Terrence
Malick: Poetic Visions of America, edited by Hanna Patterson, Second
edition, 192–198. Wallflower.
Critchley, Simon. 2002. “Calm – On Terrence Malick’s The Thin Red Line.”
Film-Philosophy 6, no. 48 (Dec).
Donougho, Martin. 2011. “‘Melt Earth to Sea’: The New World of Terrence
Malick.” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 25 (94): 359–374.
Fox, Craig, and Britt Harrison. 2020. “Inaugurating Philosophy of Film
Without Theory.” Aesthetic Investigations 3, no. 2. 175-184.
. forthcoming. Philosophy of Film Without Theory. London: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Furstenau, Marc, and Leslie MacAvoy. 2007. “Terrence Malick’s Heidegge-
rian Cinema: War and the Question of Being in The Thin Red Line.” In
The Cinema of Terrence Malick: Poetic Visions of America, edited by
Hanna Patterson, Second edition, 164–178. New York, NY: Wallflower.
Garrett, Daniel. 2008. “The American Sublime, the Sublime American:
The New World by Terrence Malick, Nature and Civilization, Individu-
ality and Consciousness”. Cinetext Internet Forum. http://cinetext.
philo.at/magazine/garrett/thenewworld.html; Accessed 3.5.2016.
Heidegger, Martin. 1962. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie
and Edward Robinson. Oxford: Blackwell.
. 1971. On the Origin of a Work of Art. Translated by Albert
Hofstadter. New York, NY: Harper & Row.
225
The New World: Heideggerian or Humanist Cinema?
. 1977. Basic Writings. Edited by David Farrell Krell. New York,
NY: Harper & Row.
Loht, Shawn. 2013. “Film as Heideggerian Art? A Reassessment of Heideg-
ger, Film, and His Connection to Terrence Malick.” Film and Philosophy
17:113–136.
. 2015. “The Relevance of Heidegger’s Conception of Philosophy to
the Film-as-Philosophy Debate.” Film and Philosophy 19:34–53.
Maher Jr., Paul. 2014. One Big Soul: An Oral History of Terrence Malick.
Third edition. Lulu.com.
Martin, Adrian. 2007. “Approaching The New World.” In The Cinema of
Terrence Malick: Poetic Visions of America, edited by Hanna Patterson,
Second edition, 212–221. New York, NY: Wallflower.
Michaels, Lloyd. 2009. Terrence Malick. Chicago, Ill.: University of Illinois
Press.
Morrison, James. 2007. “Making Worlds, Making Pictures: Terrence Mal-
ick’s The New World.” In The Cinema of Terrence Malick: Poetic Visions
of America, edited by Hanna Patterson, Second edition, 199–212. New
York, NY: Wallflower.
Neer, Richard. 2011. “Terrence Malick’s New World.” Screening The Past.
https://nonsite.org/feature/terrence-malicks-new-world.
Nicol, David. 2011. “Understanding Virginia; Quoting the Sources in Ter-
rence Malick’s The New World.” Screening The Past, vol. 11.
Patterson, Hanna, ed. 2007. The Cinema of Terrence Malick: Poetic Visions
of America. Second edition. New York, NY: Wallflower.
Rybin, Steven. 2011. “Voicing Meaning: On Terrence Malick’s Charac-
ters.” In Terrence Malick: Film and Philosophy, edited by Thomas Dean
Tucker and Stuart Kendall, 13–39. London: Bloomsbury.
. 2012. Terrence Malick and the Thought of Film. Lanham, Ma.:
Lexington Books.
Silverman, Kaja. 2003. “All Things Shining.” In Loss: The Politics of
Mourning, edited by David L. Eng Eng and David Kazanjian, 323–342.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Sinnerbrink, Robert. 2006. “A Heideggerian Cinema?: On Terence Malick’s
‘The Thin Red Line’.” Film-Philosophy 10:26–37.
. 2011. New Philosophies of Film: Thinking Images. London: Con-
tinuum.
. 2014. “Cavellian Meditations: How to Do things with Film and
Philosophy.” Film-Philosophy 18:50–69.
226
Britt Harrison
. 2015. “FromMythic History to Cinematic Poetry: Terrence Malick’s
The New World Viewed.” Screening the Past, vol. 01.
. 2019. Terrence Malick: Filmmaker and Philosopher. London:
Bloomsbury Academic.
Weitz, Morris. 1956. “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics.” The Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 15 (1): 27–35.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1961. Tractatus Logic-Philosophicus. London: Rout-
ledge and Kegan Paul. translated by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness.
. 1982. Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology. Volume I.
Oxford: Blackwell. edited by G. H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman,
translated by C.G. Luckhardt and M.A.E. Aue.
. 2009. Philosophical Investigations. Fourth edition. Translated
by G. E. M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte. Oxford:
Blackwell.
227
